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Abstract: This paper contributes significantly through suggestions 
to overcome the problem created by the disastrous US drone strikes 
in Pakistan. This paper evaluates incidences of the United States’ 
combat drone strikes in Pakistan and the damage caused to innocent 
people. It seeks to determine possible violations of international 
laws and the extent to which these strikes diminish the sovereignty 
of Pakistan. After the incident of 9/11, the use of combat drones in 
armed conflicts among states, non-state actors, disruptive groups 
and organisations has increased and expanded. Combat drones 
are controlled by operators who depend for their primary sources 
of information on cameras and sensors to determine their targets. 
Drone strikes lack identification processes causing many innocent 
people to be killed or injured. Drone strikes launched in non-conflict 
areas also increase the concerns about illegitimate interference in 
a state’s territorial sovereignty and violations of international laws. 
It covers the following questions. What are the basic principles 
about the use of force? What kinds of damages are caused by US 
drone strikes in Pakistan that violate basic human rights principles? 
What are the concerns of international organisations about drone 
strikes in Pakistan? Summarily, it covers the United States unlawful 
drone strikes in Pakistan and damages caused to humanity. The 
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paper uses doctrinal qualitative analysis to situate the research 
within the ethical, legal and social parameters of the related 
statutes of international law. The research methodology adopted 
is evaluative, interpretive and analytical. The paper consists of 
8 segments: (1) drones and the United States armed forces, (2) 
some basic international law principles about the use of force, (3) 
possible human rights violations, (4) US drone strikes diminish 
the sovereignty of Pakistan, (5) demands for transparency, (6) the 
damages caused to humanity by the drone strikes, (7) concerns of 
international organisations about illegitimate drone strikes causing 
extra judicial killings and (8) some recommendations to regulate 
the use of combat drones. It demonstrates that international law 
does not regulate the use of combat drones in armed conflict and no 
considerable effort has been made to bring the use of combat drones 
under the rule of law. Furthermore, US drone strikes in Pakistan’s 
territory have been done without consensus, resulting in the violation 
of Pakistan’s sovereignty and the killing of innocent people.
Keywords: Drone strikes, Human rights violations, Pakistan’s 
territorial sovereignty, Rule of law.
Abstrak: Makalah ini menyumbang dengan ketara melalui cadangan 
untuk mengatasi masalah yang dicetuskan oleh serangan drone AS 
di Pakistan. Ia juga menilai kejadian serangan drone AS di Pakistan 
dan kerosakan ke atas orang yang tidak bersalah. Ia bertujuan 
untuk menentukan kemungkinan pelanggaran undang-undang 
antarabangsa dan sejauh mana serangan ini mencabul kedaulatan 
Pakistan. Selepas insiden 9/11, penggunaan pesawat tempur dalam 
konflik bersenjata di antara negara, pelaku bukan negara, kumpulan 
dan organisasi telah meningkat dan berkembang. Pesawat tempur ini 
dikawal oleh pengendali yang bergantung pada kamera dan sensor 
sebagai sumber maklumat utama untuk menentukan sasaran mereka. 
Serangan drone mempunyai kelemahan dalam proses pengenalan 
yang mengakibatkan ramai orang tidak bersalah terbunuh atau 
cedera. Serangan drone yang dilancarkan di kawasan bukan 
konflik juga meningkatkan kebimbangan mengenai gangguan tidak 
sah dalam kedaulatan wilayah negara dan pencabulan undang-
undang antarabangsa. Makalah ini merangkumi soalan-soalan 
berikut: Apakah asas-asas mengenai penggunaan kekerasan? 
Apa jenis kerosakan yang disebabkan oleh serangan drone AS di 
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Pakistan yang melanggar prinsip asas hak asasi manusia? Apakah 
kebimbangan organisasi antarabangsa mengenai serangan di 
Pakistan? Ringkasnya, ia mengenai serangan drone AS yang 
menyalahi undang-undang di Pakistan dan kerosakan ke atas 
manusia. Makalah ini menggunakan analisis kualitatif dalam aspek 
etika, perundangan dan sosial yang berkaitan dengan undang-
undang antarabangsa. Metodologi penyelidikan yang dipakai 
adalah evaluatif, interpretatif dan analitikal. Makalah ini terbahagi 
kepada 8 bahagian: (1) drone dan angkatan bersenjata AS; (2) 
prinsip asas undang-undang antarabangsa tentang penggunaan 
kekerasan; (3) kemungkinan pelanggaran hak asasi manusia; 
(4) serangan drone AS dan pencabulan kedaulatan Pakistan; (5) 
tuntutan terhadap ketelusan; (6) kajian terhadap kerosakan yang 
disebabkan oleh serangan drone; (7) keprihatinan organisasi 
antarabangsa terhadap serangan drone tidak sah yang menyebabkan 
pembunuhan di luar kehakiman; dan (8) mengemukakan beberapa 
cadangan untuk mengawal penggunaan pesawat tempur. Makalah 
ini membuktikan bahawa undang-undang antarabangsa tidak dapat 
mengawal penggunaan pesawat tempur dalam konflik bersenjata 
dan tidak banyak usaha yang dibuat untuk membawa penggunaan 
pesawat tempur ini di bawah kedaulatan undang-undang. Tambahan 
pula, serangan drone AS di wilayah Pakistan telah dilakukan tanpa 
persetujuan, mengakibatkan pencabulan kedaulatan Pakistan dan 
pembunuhan orang yang tidak bersalah.
Kata Kunci: Serangan, Pelanggaran hak asasi manusia, Kedaulatan 
wilayah Pakistan, Peraturan undang-undang.
INTRODUCTION
The complicated connection between war and civil liberties is a 
growing challenge in an environment of increased armed conflict. 
The advancement in technology has transformed the nature of 
modern war with the use of unmanned combat aerial vehicles, i.e. 
drones. Drones are one of the most used, preferred and effective 
armed innovations of present times.1 In armed conflict, drones can 
accurately target enemies and reduce dangers for armed forces by 
1  A. Funk, ‘Drones in contemporary warfare: The implications for human rights’, 
LSE Human Rights Blog, 2016.
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keeping them physically distanced from the battlefield. Drones are 
commonly used in armed conflict and reduce geographic constraints 
for observation and surveillance. However, targeting with drones is 
only lawful in the presence of real armed conflict or with the consent 
of the “host state”.2 The accuracy and success of a drone strike 
depend on the operator and the intelligence. Sometimes intelligence 
failures and poor weather conditions result in the deaths of innocents. 
Such an outcome violates human rights. As revealed in the aftermath 
of the United States drone strategy, drones endanger human rights, 
especially the right to life which is a violation of article 2 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
Drones should only be used when meeting the international human 
rights obligations especially under the International Human Rights 
Law (IHRL) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL).3
This paper has eight parts. First, it demonstrates the participation of 
CIA officials in conducting drones strikes. Second, it explains jus ad 
bellum and jus in Bello about the use of force. The third part evaluates 
the possible human rights violations. Fourth, it describes that US 
combat drone attacks are violating Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty 
and integrity. Fifth, it demonstrates the need for transparency. The 
sixth part gives a brief overview of the destruction caused by US 
drone strikes in Pakistan. The seventh part expresses the worries of 
international organisations about the unlawful use of combat drones 
causing extra judicial killings. The final part gives some suggestions 
to regulate the use of combat drones.
DRONES AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA) 
ARMED FORCES
After the attacks on September 11, 2001, conflicts among states, 
non-state actors and disruptive groups have led to the increased use 
of combat drones.4 Its use increased further during the Presidency of 
2 T. M. McDonnell, ‘Sow What You Reap: Using Predator and Reaper Drones to 
Carry Out Assassinations or Targeted Killings of Suspected Islamic Terrorists’, 
Geo. Wash. International Law Review, vol. 44, 2012,  p.291.
3 A. Funk, ‘Drones in contemporary warfare: The implications for human rights’, 
LSE Human Rights Blog, 2016.
4 J. Arasli, States vs. Non-State Actors: Asymmetric Conflict of the 21st Century 
and Challenges to Military Transformation, INEGMA Special Report No. 13, 
2011.
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Barack Hussain Obama. Since then, it has been a consistent armed 
strategy of the USA against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan.5 Initially, Predator drones were commonly used to 
conduct airstrikes. However, later on with the advancement of drones, 
Reaper and Avenger drones are being used for conducting airstrikes 
which are more advanced and can fly with heavy weapons.6
The advancement in drone technology has desensitised and brutalised 
war further through the use of indiscriminate force. American drone 
operators could be in Nevada or Virginia and receive instructions 
from US forces in Afghanistan.7 This physical distance creates 
emotional distance and enables the drone operators to use disastrous 
force more comfortably than the soldiers in the battlefield without 
caring for the consequences of their drone strikes which may result 
in an enormous number of civilian deaths. Moreover, drones are 
being used like computer games, except that the targets are living 
persons. A young armed officer expressed: “It’s like a video game, 
the ability to kill. It’s like freaking cool”.8
The USA’s drone operations in striking identified persons in 
“personality strikes” and striking “unknown” persons in “signature 
strikes” have obscure parameters and are a threat to civilian lives.9 
According to CIA officials, while conducting personality strikes, all 
persons involved in the process should be highly confident that the 
targeted person is present. In signature strikes, CIA officials target 
the persons without knowing their complete identity. Instead, CIA 
officials target any person for pre-identified behaviour associated 
5 A. Dworkin, Drones and targeted killing: Defining a European position, 
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 35 Old Queen Street, London, 
SW1H9JA, United Kingdom, 2013.
6  A. Funk, ‘Drones in contemporary warfare: The implications for human rights’, 
LSE Human Rights Blog, 2016.
7  R. Williams, ‘Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape’, In National 
Conference of State Legislatures, 2014.
8 D. Kilcullen, ‘Predator Drones – two words for you – no joke (they provoke 
counter attacks seen as legitimate defense)’, 18 July 2011, [web blog], https://
supportdanielboyd.wordpress.com/predator-drones-two-words-for-you-no-
joke/, (accessed 20 November 2017).
9 S. Holewinski, ‘The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of 
Targeted Killing’, 30 April 2013, https://civiliansinconflict.org, (accessed 17 
November 2017).
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with terrorist activity.10 CIA officials reveal less information about 
signature strike procedures than personality strikes. Signature strikes 
are controversial as they can cause an enormous number of deaths 
based merely on pre-identified behaviour. Signature strikes consider 
the types of people, men having weapons or in terrorist compounds, 
persons in a convoy of automobiles that have characteristics similar 
to Al-Qaeda or Taliban leaders.11
The secret drone operations conducted by the USA in Pakistan 
consist of a large number of signature strikes.12 Most drone strikes 
occur in areas generally unapproachable to autonomous external 
actors. Whether it is a personality strike or a signature strike, the lack 
of US armed personnel in the field to investigate means there are few 
pathways to verify evidence that the strike has gone well and evaded 
civilians. Camera surveillance is no substitute for eyewitnesses nor 
can it explore wreckages for forensic evidence. Further, civilians 
have no way of informing officials of what occurred to them and their 
families as there is no US centre or court to claim compensation.13
An incident that occurred in Shiga, Pakistan, reveals the flaws of the 
CIA’s current signature strikes. The CIA carried out a signature strike 
on a group on 17 March 2011 assuming that some of its members 
were linked to Al-Qaeda and all “acted in a manner consistent 
with Al-Qaeda linked militants.” The CIA had claimed to kill 20 
terrorists. However, according to locals, CIA’s official missile struck 
a Jirga, which was held to resolve a mining dispute. It killed four 
Taliban terrorists and 38 civilians including tribal police. A farmer 
named Gul Ahmed said that terrorists were present there because 
they controlled the area and any decision made would require their 
approval.14
10  J. Tandler, ‘Known and Unknowns: President Obama’s Lethal Drone Doctrine’, 
Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique note, vol. 7, no.13, 2013, p. 1-5.
11 S. Ali, & C. Abbott, ‘US Drone Strikes in Pakistan: Ineffective and illegitimate’, 
24 October 2013, https://sustainablesecurity.org, (accessed 15 November 
2017).
12  J. Tandler, ‘Known and Unknowns: President Obama’s Lethal Drone Doctrine’, 
Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique note, vol. 7, no.13, 2013, p. 1-5.
13 S. Holewinski, ‘The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of 
Targeted Killing’, 30 April 2013, https://civiliansinconflict.org, (accessed 17 
November 2017).
14 N. Shah., R. Chopra., J. Morna., C. Grut., E. Howie., D. Mule., & M. Abbott, 
The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions, 
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Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, issued 
a statement stating that tribal elders are “carelessly and callously 
targeted with complete disregard to human life.” These contradictory 
statements indicate the challenges of identifying the individuals 
who are killed by drone attacks and raise questions to the USA 
administration for its ingenuity in counting deaths.15
In 2002, Daraz Khan and his two companions were collecting scrap 
metal on top of a mountain near Southern Afghanistan. Flying above 
was a drone which received information that the men in robes who 
were in a suspected Al-Qaeda area resembled Osama Bin Laden. 
The drone operator had a firm belief that the strike was right because 
Khan had conspicuous similarities to Osama Bin Laden. However, 
Khan’s physical examination revealed that he was almost half a foot 
shorter than Osama Bin Laden. This drone attack resulted in the 
deaths of three innocent civilians which could have been avoided 
with precise information before approving the attack.16
Amnesty International, the United Nations and the Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism have researched the incidents of civilian 
damage in Pakistan and gathered media reports of attacks to 
estimate the figures of civilian killings. President Barack Obama’s 
administration claimed that USA drones killed 64 to 116 innocent 
civilians, but according to research by the Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism, at least 380 to 801 innocent civilians were killed. 
Admittedly, access is also a challenge for those organisations. 
Although their estimations show a discrepancy about the total 
numbers of civilian deaths, these organisations always indicate 
significantly higher civilian deaths than those presented by the US 
administration.17
Center for Civilians in Conflict, Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic, 
20, 2012.
15 N. Shah., R. Chopra., J. Morna., C. Grut., E. Howie., D. Mule., & M. Abbott, 
The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions, 
Center for Civilians in Conflict, Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic, 
20, 2012.
16 C. W. Staff, ‘Drone Strikes Kill, Maim, and Traumatize Too Many Civilians, 
US Study Says’, 25 September 2012, edition.cnn.com/2012/09/25/world/asia/
pakistan-us-drone-strikes, (accessed 19 November 2017).
17 S. Holewinski, ‘The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of 
Targeted Killing’, 30 April 2013, https://civiliansinconflict.org, (accessed 17 
November 2017).
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INTERNATIONAL LAWS REGARDING USE OF FORCE: 
JUS AD BELLUM AND JUS IN BELLO
Jus Ad Bellum
Maintaining international peace and security is a principal objective 
of the United Nations under article 1(1) of its charter. To accomplish 
this goal, article 24 encompasses the prohibition of the use of force 
among UN member states. Articles 39 and 51 of the UN charter 
contain sanctions which are imposed against any state that violates 
the provisions of the UN charter regarding the use of force.18
According to article 1(1) of the UN charter, its objective is, “To 
maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of (a) 
threats to the peace, and for the (b) suppression of acts of aggression 
or (c) other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful 
means.... adjustment or settlement of international disputes or 
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.”19
For sustaining international peace and security and to prevent wars 
among member states, article 2(3) of the UN charter sets responsibility 
on member states to resolve their issues peaceably. It states, “All 
members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means 
in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, 
are not endangered.”20 Article 2(4) forbids member states to use 
force against any other member state. It states, “All members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.”21
A collective sanction system secures this prohibition. Articles 39 
to 51 contain sanctions which are imposed against any offending 
member state that violates these international peacekeeping 
provisions. Article 39 of the UN charter states, “The Security Council 
18  United Nations Charter Article 39 to 51.
19  United Nations Charter Article 1.
20  United Nations Charter Article 2(3).
21  United Nations Charter Article 2(4).
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shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with articles 41 
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”22
The Security Council under article 41 of the UN charter is authorised 
to impose business, industrial and weapons restrictions. Article 41 
of the United Nations charter states, “The Security Council may 
decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to 
be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon 
the members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These 
may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations 
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraph, radio and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relation.”23
The Security Council is allowed to use the force required under 
article 42 of the UN charter to maintain international peace. The 
Security Council allows member states to use force against offending 
states to restore international peace and security as it does not have 
its own armed force. Article 42 of the UN charter states, “Should 
the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 
41would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take 
such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain 
or restore international peace and security. Such action may include 
demonstrations, blockades and other operations by air, sea, or land 
forces of Members of the United Nations.”24
In the case of armed attacks against any member state, article 51 of 
the UN charter allows the member state to use force in its defence: 
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individuals or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council 
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of 
self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council 
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of 
the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time 
22  United Nations Charter Article 39.
23  United Nations Charter Article 41.
24  United Nations Charter Article 42.
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such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.”25 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) permits member states to 
use force against the offending state in self-defense following the set 
doctrines of necessity and proportionality.26
International law for the use of drones
The US defends its attack on Afghanistan on the basis of the same 
provision of the UN charter about self-defence. It describes the 
events of 9/11 as armed attacks discounting the fact that until today, 
the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks are still unknown while also 
discounting the doctrines of necessity and proportionality.
In 2002, Hamid Karzai after ending the Taliban rule came into 
power in Afghanistan and requested the already present international 
military forces in the state to combat the rebellious sets.27 Therefore, 
the US’s legitimate use of force was restricted to the boundaries of 
Afghanistan. Since then, the US has started using combat drones in 
the tribal areas of Pakistan to target several terrorist groups with and 
without the permission of Pakistan. It has also used drone missiles in 
non-conflict areas without the consent of Pakistan.28
Although it is intimated that several terrorist groups regularly cross 
the boundaries of Afghanistan and enter into Pakistan, this does not 
authorise the US to use force or perform drone attacks in Pakistani 
territory without its consent. Similarly, that a terrorist group organises 
or performs a terrorist action in a state does not allow using force 
under the right of self-defence because such activities are carried out 
by non-state actors and states are seldom liable for such actions.29
25 United Nations Charter Article 51.
26 J. Moussa, ‘Can Jus ad Bellum override Jus in Bello? Reaffirming the Separation 
of the Two Bodies of Law’, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 90 
no.872, 2008, p.963-990.
27 W. A. Qureshi, ‘The legality and conduct of drone attacks’,  Notre Dame Journal 
International Comparative Law, vol.7, no.2, 2017, p. 91.
28 B. J. Strawser, et al., Opposing perspectives on the drone debate, 1st ed, Palgrave 
Macmillan in the United States, 2014, p. 177.
29 United Nations Charter Article 51.
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Apart from these clear rules, the US claims that the 9/11 attacks 
signify the use of force and as a result, it can use any possible action 
to fight against Al-Qaeda anywhere in the world. President George 
W. Bush defends the use of force by labelling it the “global war on 
terror” while President Barack Hussein Obama describes it as armed 
conflict with Al-Qaeda and other related groups to defend its use of 
force under the pretence of self-defence. The Obama government 
adopts the “pre-emptive self-defence” model to end “future attacks”. 
This approach conflicts with the set rules of customary international 
law.30
According to the International Law Association (ILA), armed conflict 
is described by setting basic parameters for the use of force in which 
an armed conflict must have an organised party battling other parties. 
The isolated attacks of terrorist groups do not constitute an armed 
conflict and do not fall under the standards mentioned above.31 
Moreover, the US has attempted to defend its drone strikes based on 
the doctrine of Hot Pursuit. However, this law is applicable only on 
the seas and not on the land.32
The importance of the consent of the host state
The topic of consent is essential in evaluating the legitimacy of the 
use of drone missiles for two purposes. Primarily, a state cannot use 
force without the presence of real armed conflict even in its territory. 
Secondly, if a real armed conflict exists, then the drone strikes must 
meet the doctrines of necessity and proportionality.33
There are various concerns regarding the drone strikes working 
without the consent of the affected states. Drone attacks without 
the consent of the affected states contravene US policies and the 
sovereignty of the “host state”. However, the US rejects claims 
30 W. A. Qureshi, ‘The legality and conduct of drone attacks’,  Notre Dame Journal 
International Comparative Law, vol.7, no.2, 2017, p. 91.
31 J. Summers, Kosovo: A precedent? : The declaration of independence, the 
advisory opinion and implications for statehood, self-determination and 
minority rights, Leiden Boston, Brill, 2011.
32 Convention on the High Seas Article. 23, 29 April 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 
U.N.T.S. 11.
33 D. Akerson, ‘Applying Jus in Bello proportionally to drone warfare’, Or. Rev. 
International Law., vol.16, 2014, p.173.
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that the “host states” have not given the authority to conduct drone 
strikes in their territories.34
A book titled Confront and Conceal by David Sanger in 2008 claims 
that Prime Minister Yusaf Raza Gillani said to Anne Patterson, 
the US Ambassador that, “I do not care if you conduct the drone 
attacks, as long as you get the right people”.35 The US also claims 
that Pakistan has authorised it to conduct combat drone strikes using 
Pakistani air bases and that it assists US armed forces by providing 
information for finding the targets in the Federal Administrative 
Tribal Areas (FATA).36
In 2012, the New York Times named the persons employed by 
Pakistan’s military intelligence to assist US officials to conduct drone 
strikes. However, these officials opposed Pakistan’s official stand 
that opposes the drone attacks.37 Some reports claim that the US 
did not obtain official authorisation from Pakistan to conduct drone 
strikes in its territory, but rather it got “tacit consent” by Pakistan not 
resisting the strikes by effectively allowing them to proceed.38
These claims are controversial because Pakistan’s official stance 
contradicts such statements.39 According to Harold Koh, the 
absence of official authority is an act of war against the sovereignty 
34  B. Tau, ‘Brennan: Drones ‘necessary’, POLITICO’, POLITICO, 30 April 
2012, https://www.politico.com/story/2012/04/brennan-drones-necessary-not-
vengeance-075751, (accessed 4 December 2017).
35 D. E. Sanger, ‘Obama order sped up wave of cyber attacks against Iran’, The 
New York Times, 1 June 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/
middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html, (accessed 
5 December 2017).
36  Z. Ahmed, ‘Strengthening standards for consent: The case of U.S. drone strikes 
in Pakistan’, Michigan State International Law Review, vol.23 no.2, 2015, p. 
491-500.
37 D. Walsh, ‘Drone war spurs militants to deadly reprisals’, New York 
Times, 29December 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/30/world/
asia/drone-war-in-pakistan-spurs-militants-to-deadly-reprisals.html, 
(accessed 3 December 2017).
38 D. A. Mahapatra, Conflict and peace in Eurasia, London and New York, 
Routledge, 2012.
39 A. Entous, S. Gorman & E. Perez, ‘US unease over drone strikes: 
Obama administration charts delicate legal path defending controversial 
weapons’, The Wall Street Journal, 2012, p. 26.
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of Pakistan.40 The Bureau of Investigation Journalism also claims 
that Pakistan has not authorised or granted consent to conduct drone 
strikes on its land and opposes “tacit consent”.41
In 2012, Pakistan’s parliament collectively approved the immediate 
closure of the United States drone struck in Pakistan.42
Jus in Bello
The presence of an armed conflict decides the applicability of IHL 
and IHRL. Both laws are applicable only in armed conflict and serve 
to determine the legality of killing.43 There will be an actual armed 
conflict if the following two conditions of these laws are met.44
Firstly, ferocity should be of an intense nature, and armed conflict 
is separated from in-house disruptions or isolated and intermittent 
acts of violence.45 Secondly, the belligerent should be appropriately 
organised to be categorised as participants in an armed conflict.46 A 
non-state actor that is appropriately organised and having a chain 
of command and the capability to perform armed operations can be 
deemed a “party”.47
40 F. Sperotto, ‘The future of the American fight against terrorism’, Rivista di 
Studi Politici Internazionali, 2014, p.221-230.
41 C. Woods, ‘Pakistan ‘categorically rejects’ claim that it tacitly allows U.S. 
drone strikes’, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 28 September 2012, 
[website],https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2012-09-28/
pakistan-categorically-rejects-claim-that-it-tacitly-allows-us-drone-strikes, 
(accessed 30 November 2017).
42 U.N., ‘Pakistan presses on its demand for end to illegal drone strikes’, THE 
NEWS, 2 July 2016, https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/132367-Pakistan-
presses-demand-end-illegal-drone-strikes, (accessed 2 December 2017).
43 J. B. Hosang, ‘The effects of paradigm shifts on the rules on the use of force in 
military operations, Netherlands International Law Review, vol.64, no.3, 2017, 
p. 353-373.
44 IT-03-66-T, Prosecutor v. Limaj, 84, 2005, ICTY 30 November 2005.
45 T. Kelisiana, ‘Targeting the “terrorist enemy”: The boundaries of an armed 
conflict against transnational terrorists’, Australian International Law Journal, 
vol.16, 2009, p. 161-166.) & See Case No. IT-04-82-T, Prosecutor v. Boskoski, 
Judgment, 2008, 175, ICTY 10 July 2008.
46 L. Noam, ‘Extraterritorial use of force against non-state actors’, Military Law 
and the Law of War Review, vol.49, 2010, p. 173.
47 IT-04-82-T, Prosecutor v. Boskoski, Judgment, 2008, 199-203, ICTY 10 July 
2008, Detailing five categories of factors.
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The evaluation of war is complicated by the ‘global war on terror’ 
announced by the Bush administration and the ‘translational armed 
conflict’ against Al-Qaeda claimed by the Obama administration.48
In the absence of “actual armed conflict” in Pakistan and the absence 
of valid consent, the US is committing war crimes by violating the 
sovereignty of Pakistan under international law.49
The principles of IHL
In an armed conflict, the deliberate use of force is lawful if it fulfils the 
principles of “International Humanitarian Law” sometimes referred 
to as “Jus in Bello”. The doctrine of “distinction” is imperative and 
identifies persons involved in armed attacks as lawful targets of 
military force while the law protects persons who are not involved 
in armed attacks.50
This rule of “distinction” is hard to use in disputes comprising non-
state actors because participants of military groups do not proceed 
to extricate themselves from those who are not involved in conflicts. 
Moreover, the related treaties do not explain the terms of “civilian” 
and “armed forces”.51
ARMED DRONES AND VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Extensive use of armed drones means that more states and possibly 
non-state actors may also try to use this unmanned equipment. This 
situation is alarming. The strikes with armed drones have resulted in 
a significant number of civilian deaths in addition to the extrajudicial 
killings of the suspected terrorists.52 Drone missiles often kill 
48 W. Benjamin,  ‘Jeh Johnson, ‘National security law, lawyers and lawyering in 
the Obama Administration’, Speech at Yale Law School, 22 February 2012, 
[website], http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/02/jeh-johnson-speech-at-yale-
lawschool, (accessed 28 November 2017).
49 W. A. Qureshi, ‘The legality and conduct of drone attacks’,  Notre Dame Journal 
of International & Comparative Law, vol.7, no.2, 2017, p.5.
50 The Additional Protocols I of 8 June 1977 (API) Art. 51(2).
51 J. K. Kleffner, ‘From ‘belligerents’ to ‘fighters’ and civilians directly 
participating in hostilities–on the principle of distinction in non-international 
armed conflicts one hundred years after the second Hague Peace Conference’, 
Netherlands International Law Review, vol.54, no.2, 2007, p.315-336.
52 K. Anderson, ‘Rise of the drones: Unmanned systems and the future of war’, 
129
UUMJLS 9 July 2018 (115-151)
individuals based on vague identification mechanisms and without 
a fair public court hearing which is a violation of Article 14 of the 
ICCPR.53 While discussing the national security and fight against 
terrorists, states refuse to take responsibility for these extrajudicial 
killings, which consequently generates an environment of freedom 
for such killings. This has raised questions about violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law.54 The US’s drone 
strikes in Pakistan have violated the international law standards.55 
According to article 6(1) of the ICCPR, “Every human being has the 
inherent right to life. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” 
This right is a resolute standard of international law and can never 
be suspended in wars or conflicts. An international treaty binds both 
the US and Pakistan being state parties of ICCPR to comply with 
this law.56
The use of armed drones also creates an environment of fear and 
anxiety in areas of Pakistan targeted by the haphazard and disparate 
drone attacks.57 Drones have gravely destroyed human rights such 
as the right of peaceful gathering (violation of article 21 of ICCPR), 
freedom of religion, the right of education and support to sufferers of 
drone attacks which is another violation of article 18 of ICCPR.58
American University Washington College of Law, 2010.
53 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 19 December 1966, Article 14.
54 O. Bowcott, ‘Drone strikes threaten 50 years of international law, says UN 
rapporteur’, The Guardian, 21 June 2012, http://www.agriculturedefensecoalition.
org/sites/default/files/file/drones_517/517X_1_2012_U.S._Drone_
Strikes_Threaten_50_Years_of_International_Law_Guardian.co.uk_
June_21_2012pdf.pdf,  (accessed 17 November 2017).
55 C. Jenks, ‘Law from above: Unmanned aerial systems, use of force, and the law 
of armed conflict’, NDL, Rev. 85, 2009, p. 649.
56  M. Sterio, ‘The United States’ use of drones in the War on Terror: The (IL) 
legality of targeted killings under international law’, Case W. Res. J. Int’l L., 
vol. 45, 2012, p. 197.
57 M. Akbar, Drone attacks and suicide bombings: Reflections on Pakistan’s 
victims, In International Perspectives on Terrorist Victimisation, London, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, pp. 201-224. Available from: E-Book Library, 
(accessed 23 November 2017).
58 J. Becker, & S. Shane, ‘Secret ‘kill list’ proves a test of Obama’s principles and 
will’, New York Times, 29 May 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/
obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html, (accessed 15 November 2017).
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US DRONE ATTACKS AND SOVEREIGNTy OF PAKISTAN
Drone strikes started in Pakistan under President Bush and continued 
under President Obama’s government despite the opposition from 
Pakistan’s administration. In Pakistan, President Obama endorsed 
“personality strikes’ aimed at killing high-profile militants and 
“signature strikes” to destroy training camps and dubious compounds 
in the zones controlled by terrorists59. Signature strikes are still in 
practice despite growing opposition from Pakistan as it violates 
its airspace and endangers its sovereignty. Pakistani citizens have 
become more angered than ever over continued US drone operations 
in the country.60 Allegedly, these covert signature strikes have killed 
416-959 innocent civilians61.
Ben Emmerson, the UN special rapporteur on human rights and 
counter-terrorism and head of a UN team investigating losses from 
the US drone attacks in Pakistan, announced after a secret research 
tour that the US drone strikes violate Pakistan’s sovereignty. 
Emmerson met with Pakistani officials and announced that “the 
position of the government of Pakistan is quite clear, it does not 
consent to the use of drones by the United States on its territory, 
and it considers this to be a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. He also said that the drone operation “involves 
the use of force on the territory of another state without its consent 
and is, therefore, a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty.”62
Pakistan alleges that the US drone strikes are “radicalising” a new 
“generation” of terrorists while the country itself was able to fight 
against extremism in its territory. Emmerson during his visit met 
with different Pakistani officials including tribal leaders from North 
59 J. Becker, & S. Shane, ‘Secret ‘kill list’ proves a test of Obama’s principles and 
will’, New York Times, 29 May 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/
obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html, (accessed 15 November 2017).
60  RT. America, ‘Drones Kill First, Ask Later’,7 November 2011, https://www.
rt.com, (accessed 12 November 2017).
61 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, [website], https://www.
thebureauinvestigates.com, (accessed 22 November 2017).
62 AP, ‘U.N.: Drone strikes violate Pakistan’s sovereignty’, USA Today, 15 March 
2013, https://www.usatoday.com, (accessed 24 November 2017).
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Waziristan (the area most targeted by U.S. drones).63 He claims that 
“the tribal leaders said innocent tribesmen were often mistakenly 
targeted by drones because they were indistinguishable from the 
Taliban militants” as tribesmen and terrorist groups wear similar 
traditional tribal clothes and usually carry guns along with them at 
all times.64
Therefore, the US’s current operational drone policy in Pakistan, 
which is not an armed conflict area, is highly controversial and violates 
IHRL including the right to life and the right to due process.65 Thus, 
US drone strikes in Pakistan raise fears about violation of Pakistani 
sovereignty and human rights.66 It is a violation of article 2(4) of 
the UN charter that prohibits a member state to use force against 
any other member state. Moreover, the failure to make countries 
answerable for the human rights violations under IHRL is another 
violation in itself. So, there must be legal accountability by the US 
for using indiscriminate drone force against innocent civilians in 
Pakistan.67
NEED FOR TRANSPARENCy
The absence of transparency is a major concern within the current 
use of drone attacks as duly recognised in the report of the Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). It claims that 
“based on available information, it is difficult to investigate how the 
current use of drones is in compliance with international law (since) 
 
63 B. Wittes, ‘U.N. Special Rapporteur Statement on Pakistan and Drone Strikes’, 
1 September 2013, [web blog], http://www.lawfareblog.com, (accessed 27 
November 2017).
64 AP, ‘U.N.: drone strikes violate Pakistan’s sovereignty’, USA Today, 15 March 
2013, https://www.usatoday.com, (accessed 24 November 2017).
65 M. Sterio, ‘The United States’ use of drones in the war on terror: the (IL) legality 
of targeted killings under international law’, Case W. Res. J. Int’l L., vol. 45, 
2012, p. 197.
66 A. C. Orr, ‘Unmanned, unprecedented, and unresolved: The status of American 
drone strikes in Pakistan under international law, Cornell Int’l LJ, vol.44, 2011, 
p. 729.
67 Amnesty International, USA must be held to account for drone killings in 
Pakistan, [website], 2013, https://www.amnesty.org, (accessed 15 November 
2017).
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there is an awful lack of transparency regarding the standards used 
to identify those who constitute a legal target as well as the number 
of civilians killed.”68
The legitimacy of any drone attack is difficult to judge due to the 
lack of transparency. Despite enormous civilian killings, the states 
using armed drones do not recognise that their strikes have caused 
such killings. In the absence of transparency, there is no way for the 
general public to judge the legality or illegality of civilians’ killings. 
The absence of transparency obscures accountability and facilitates 
abuses of international laws.69 Therefore, the US should announce the 
results of each strike publicly. This would make the accountability 
of the CIA officials involved in civilian killings possible.70
Some US State Department officials have criticised that the criteria 
exercised by the CIA officials for detecting a terrorist “signature” 
are extremely non-judgemental. One senior CIA official alleged that 
it is a joke that CIA officials consider tribesmen doing “jumping 
jacks” at a terrorist training camp.71
The Bureau of Investigative Journalism has performed field research 
by taking field work of other organisations including the Associated 
Press and Amnesty International and spent almost three years 
collecting and analysing media reports to derive an opinion about 
“what the US is doing with its drones in Pakistan.” This research calls 
for transparency of an alleged covert drone war and the verification 
of the US government’s claims on their drone attacks. It reveals that 
the CIA director John Brennan’s statement that “U.S. drones had not 
killed a civilian from August 2010 till the end of June 2011” was 
 
68 WILPF, ‘Armed drones killing human rights?’, 29 September 2014, http://
wilpf.org, (accessed 26 November 2017).
69 WILPF, ‘Armed drones killing human rights?’, 29 September 2014, http://
wilpf.org, (accessed 26 November 2017).
70 Amnesty International, USA must be held to account for drone killings in 
Pakistan, [website], 2013, https://www.amnesty.org, (accessed 15 November 
2017).
71 J. Becker, & S. Shane, ‘Secret ‘kill list’ proves a test of Obama’s principles and 
will’, New York Times, 29 May 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/
obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html, (accessed 15 November 2017).
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untrue. The research shows at least 73 innocent civilians, including 
12 children were reportedly killed during that period. Despite the 
isolation of tribal areas of Pakistan, news emerges because of the 
courage of Pakistan’s journalists.72
Furthermore, Amnesty International’s appeal for transparency 
emphasises the troubles faced by the families of drone victims to get 
compensation. The Amnesty International’s report, Will I be next? 
US drone strikes in Pakistan argues that “the lack of disclosure about 
drone strikes means that victims are able to access neither justice 
nor compensation.” The report also states, “Secrecy surrounding 
the drones program gives the USA’s administration a licence to kill 
beyond the reach of the courts or basic standards of international 
law. What hope for redress can there be for victims of the drone 
attacks and their families when the USA won’t even acknowledge 
its responsibility for particular strikes?”73
DAMAGE OF US DRONE STRIKES IN PAKISTAN
There may be systematic defects in the intelligence upon which strike 
decisions are based. These defects may include restrictions in drone 
video observation, signals interruption, cultural knowledge and 
human intelligence presented by local informers and collaborating 
governments. While making decisions about strikes, the operators 
have to rely on the information collected from the drone’s cameras 
and sensors. These are the sources of primary information while 
minimal information comes from the field.74 A drone’s efficiency 
is also be affected by environmental conditions and can only 
assess one particular place at a time.75 Moreover, targets are often 
 
 
72  J. Serle, ‘The lack of transparency in drone attacks’, 16 October 2014, http:// 
 www.rawa.org, (accessed 11 November 2017).
73 Amnesty International, “Will I be next?” US drone strikes in Pakistan, 
[website], 2013,https://www.amnestyusa.org, (accessed 15 November 2017).
74 M. E. O’Connell, ‘Unlawful killing with combat drones: A case study of 
Pakistan, 2004-2009’, Notre Dame Law School, 2010.
75 S. J. Kim, G. J. Lim, & J. Cho, ‘Drone relay stations for supporting wireless 
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surrounded by innocent people who become victims having no 
part in the conflict and are simply in the wrong place at the wrong 
time.76
Due to these defects or shortcomings, about 32% innocent civilians 
have been killed in the US drone strikes in Pakistan. From June 
2004 to February 2015, the CIA had conducted 413 drone strikes in 
Pakistan. According to Bureau of Investigative Journalism (BIJ), 
the strikes have killed 2,438-3,942 people; 416-959 of whom were 
civilians and 168-204 were children.77 Apart from the vast number 
of civilians killed, in reality, one civilian death or injury changes 
the life of an entire family. In Pakistan, families are often big, and 
their welfare is interconnected. Therefore, the death of one member 
can create long-life instability, especially if an income producer is 
killed.78
Table 1. CIA and US Military Drone Strikes, Minimum People 
Killed Including Terrorists and Minimum Civilians Killed (Innocent 








2004 1 6 2
2005 3 16 5
2006 2 94 90
2007 5 36 11
2008 38 252 59
(continued)
communication in military operations’, In International Conference on Applied 
Human Factors and Ergonomics, Springer, Cham. Vol. 595, 2017, pp. 123-
130.
76 M. Benjamin, Drone warfare: Killing by remote control, New York and London, 
Verso Books, 2013.
77 M. I. Ahmad, ‘The magical realism of body counts: How media credulity and 
flawed statistics sustain a controversial policy’, Journalism, vol.17, no.1, 2016, 
p.18-34.
78 M. S. Akbar, ‘The folly of drone attacks and U.S. strategy’, 5 October 2012, 
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2010 128 755 89
2011 75 362 52
2012 50 212 13
2013 27 109 0
2014 25 115 0
2015 13 60 2
2016 3 11 1
2017 5 15 0
Total 429 2514 424
Source: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ.com).
Figure 1. Number of US Drone Strikes in Pakistan since 2004 till 
Present.
Source: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ.com).
This chart shows that the number of drone strikes was the highest 
in 2010 showing 128 strikes while after 2010, a gradual decrease is 
seen because of the strict action taken by Pakistan’s army.
On December 9, 2011, Pakistan’s Army chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez 
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violating Pakistan’s air space. Therefore, to appease the Pakistan 
Army, the USA decreased its drone strike and restricted it to high 
profile terrorists only.79
Figure 2. Minimum People Killed in Pakistan by US Drone Strikes 
since 2004 Till Present.
Source: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ.com).
The chart above describes the number of killings per year which 
shows that in 2004, the number of minimum people killed was 6. It 
was the highest in 2010 in which 755 minimum people were killed. 
After 2010 there was a gradual decrease in the killings as a result of 
Pakistani administration’s strict stance.
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Figure 3. Minimum Civilians Killed in Pakistan by US Drone 
Strikes since 2004 till Present. 
Source: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ.com).
This chart shows the number of civilian killings on a yearly basis 
which indicates that during 2009, one hundred civilians were killed. 
In 2006, 90 civilians were killed followed by 2010 in which the US 
drone strikes killed 89 civilians in Pakistan.
Table 2. Number of Drone Strikes by USA in Pakistan according to 
Presidency





January 20, 2001 to January 20, 2009 51 410
Barack Hussain Obama 
January 20, 2009 to January 20,2017 373 2,089
Donald Trump 
January 20, 2017 onwards 5 15
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Table 2: Number of Drone Strikes by USA in Pakistan according to Presidency 
US President US Drone strikes Minimum people killed 
George Bush 
January 20, 2001 to January 20, 2009 
51 410 
Barack Hussain Obama 
January 20, 2009 to January 20,2017 
373 2,089 
Figure3. Minimum Civilians Killed in Pakistan by US Drone Strikes since 2004 
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Figure 4. US Drone Strikes by President in Pakistan.
Source: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ.com). 
The chart above shows the number of strikes during different 
presidential eras which demonstrate that during the George W. Bush 
presidency a minimum of 410 people were killed in 51drone strikes. 
During the Barack Obama presidency a minimum of 2,089 minimum 
people were killed while during the Donald Trump presidency from 
January 2017 onwards a minimum of 15 people were killed in 5 
drone strikes. 
Table 3. Casualty Rates for Us Drone Strikes since 2004 till the 
Present in Pakistan (People Killed per Strike)
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Figure 4: US Drone Strikes by President in Pakistan. 
Source: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ.com).  
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Source: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ.com).
Figure 5. Casualty Rates for US Drone Strikes since 2004 till the 
Present in Pakistan (People Killed per Strike).
Note: 2006 data has been excluded as an attack in October that year.
Source: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ.com).
The chart above demonstrates total casualty rates and civilian 
casualty rates from 2004 to 2017. It indicate that the total casualty 
rate was 7.2 while the civilian casualty rate was 2.2. In 2009 the total 
casualty rate was 8.7 while the civilian casualty rate was 1.9 while 
it was the minimum in 2017 with 3.0 total casualty rates and zero 
civilian casualty rates.
Hakeem Khan told the Centre for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) 
that he was in pain, and he struggled to move as he lost his leg 
after a drone missile hit his neighbour’s home. Women in the areas 
frequently struck by drones have inadequate earning resources. Lack 
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Sons are supposed to quit their schools to earn, and daughters skip 
education to look after their families.80 In another drone strike in 
Pakistan, instead of hitting the Taliban, the missile struck the house 
of a tribal elder and member of the local pro-government peace 
committee, Malik Gulistan Khan, killing him and four other members 
of his family.81 His 18 year-old son Adnan told, “I lost my father, 
three brothers, and my cousin in this attack.” Adnan’s uncle Habib 
Khan said, “We did nothing, had no connection with militants at all. 
Our family supported the government and in fact…was a member of 
a local peace committee.” The family of the deceased has submitted 
all the documents related to the deaths of their five family members 
to the Centre for Civilians in Conflict, along with the report from 
the Assistant Political Agent of South Waziristan and a local Jirga 
demanding the government to give them compensation. They are 
depressed with the passing of their family members.82
Amnesty International’s report, Will I be next? US drone strikes in 
Pakistan focuses on nine strikes which resulted in civilian deaths out 
of the alleged 45 strikes in Pakistan’s Waziristan region from January 
2012 to August 2013. The report provides the details of the killing 
of 68 year-old Mamana Bibi by a drone strike while collecting okra 
in the fields of the Tappi village near Miranshah, North Waziristan 
on 24 October 2012. One of her granddaughters found her and 
reported. “I saw her shoes. We found her mutilated body a short 
time afterwards. It had been thrown quite a long distance away by 
the blast and it was in pieces.”83 
The Amnesty researchers told Pakistani intelligence officials that a 
local Taliban terrorist used a satellite phone on a road adjacent to 
80 N. Shah., R. Chopra., J. Morna., C. Grut., E. Howie., D. Mule., & M. Abbott, 
The civilian impact of drones: Unexamined costs, unanswered questions, 
Center for Civilians in Conflict, Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic, 
20, 2012.
81 F. Kutty, ‘Drone warfare book review: Medea Benjamin, drone warfare killing 
by remote control (London: Verso 2012)’, 11 J. Int’l L. & Int’l Relations, 
Valparaiso University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 15-2, 2015.
82 A Rapporteur of Center for Civilians in Conflict, Civilian Harm and Conflict in 
Northwest Pakistan [website], 2010, www.civiliansinconflict.org, (accessed 15 
December 2017).
83 Amnesty International, “Will I be next?” US drone strikes in Pakistan, 
[website], 2013,https://www.amnestyusa.org, (accessed 15 November 2017).
141
UUMJLS 9 July 2018 (115-151)
Mamana Bibi 10 minutes before the strike. The CIA officials said 
that they were not aware of the reason for her killing except her 
presence was close to a Taliban militant. Amnesty International 
researchers did not find any evidence of the presence of any terrorist 
in the area at the time of the strike, and the place of the drone strike 
was nearly 1,000 feet away from the nearest road.
The said Amnesty report also gave details of a group of 18 labourers, 
including a 14 years old boy killed in a drone strike in July 2012 in 
Pakistan. A group of men and women had gathered for their evening 
meal when the first missile struck. The field research by Amnesty 
International discovered that the strike was then tailed by another 
missile killing rescuers who were trying to recover bodies. It was the 
first time that all victims of the drone strike were identified.
Mustafa Qadri, who directed the research, said: “We cannot find 
any justification for these killings. They are genuine threats to the 
USA and its allies in the region, and drone strikes may be lawful 
in some circumstances. But it is hard to believe that a group of 
labourers, or an elderly woman surrounded by her grandchildren, 
were endangering anyone at all, let alone posing an imminent threat 
to the United States.”
The report states. “Amnesty International has serious concerns that 
this attack violates the prohibition of the arbitrary deprivation of life 
and may constitute war crimes or extrajudicial executions.”84
FINANCIAL CRISES, DISPLACEMENT AND DEPRESSION
Ownership of land is a valuable asset for a family in northern Pakistan 
where a house is small and accommodates several families. Given 
such socio-economic conditions, drone strikes on any house produce 
a great degree of vulnerability and homelessness. The statistics are 
high, implying increased misery and suffering in the society. Many 
people are known to have survived by taking shelters in mosques. 
For instance, Usman Wazir, who despite having a stable economic 
84 Amnesty International, USA must be held to account for drone killings in 
Pakistan, [website], 2013, https://www.amnesty.org, (accessed 15 November 
2017).
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background, has become homeless due to a drone strike at his house. 
That drone strike had taken the life of his brother, spouse and young 
children. Shakeel Khan, who now looks after his old parents, saved 
himself from a drone strike, though the strike claimed the lives of 
other family members. Shakeel Khan has spoken to the Centre for 
Civilians in Conflict that he is struggling to support himself and his 
parents. He said, “We don’t have enough to reconstruct our houses 
and fear that the drones will strike us again.”85 Daud Khan and his 
family were forced to move from their village in Waziristan as they 
did not have enough money to reconstruct their house wrecked in a 
drone attack. Daud Khan was at his home with his 10 year-old son 
Khaliq in Northern Waziristan when a drone missile struck his house. 
He told that, “The day before a Taliban had come to the house and 
asked for lunch. I was afraid of them and was unable to stop them 
because all the local people had to offer them food. They stayed 
for about one hour and then left. The very next day our house was 
hit and my only son Khaliq was killed. I saw his body, completely 
burnt.”86
Psychological distress is a harmful aftereffect of drone attacks which 
is tough to evaluate and will be an insidious problem for residents 
for years to come, even after the completion of drone attacks. In 
the northern areas of Pakistan, civilians are living in fear of being 
hit by drones flying there 24 hours a day. Michael Kugelman of the 
Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars said, “I have 
heard Pakistanis speak about children in the tribal areas who become 
hysterical when they hear the characteristic buzz of a drone. Imagine 
the effect this has on psyches, and particularly on young ones 
already scarred by war and displacement.” The scariness or anxiety 
due to covert drone attacks can greatly affect the whole community 
according to Kugelman.87
85 N. Shah., R. Chopra., J. Morna., C. Grut., E. Howie., D. Mule., & M. Abbott, 
The civilian impact of drones: Unexamined costs, unanswered questions, 
Center for Civilians in Conflict, Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic, 
20, 2012.
86 The World Can’t Wait, ‘Photos of Victims of US drone Wars in Pakistan and 
Yemen’, 17 April 2014, https://www.worldcantwait.net, (accessed 24 November 
2017).
87 ‘Youth disrupted: Effects of U.S. drone strikes on children in targeted areas, 
https://pakistanthinktank.org/children-killed-in-drone-attacks-in-pakistan, 
(accessed 12 November 2017).
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One victim said to the Centre for Civilians in Conflict, “We fear 
that the drones will strike us again… my aged parents are often in a 
state of fear. We are depressed, anxious and constantly remembering 
our deceased family members…it often compels me to leave this 
place.” Another man expressed the suffering of his sister-in-law 
whose husband and two sons were killed in a US drone strike in 
Pakistan, “After their death, she is mentally upset…she is always 
screaming and shouting at night and demanding me to take her to 
their graves.”88
Due to the secret striking criteria, civilians living in the drone targeted 
areas of Pakistan “do not know when, where, or against whom a 
drone would strike.” The obscure nature of the strikes, especially 
concerning signature strikes, creates a constant fear that a family 
member will be unexpectedly killed. Moreover, civilians who are 
victims of drone attacks may be presumed to be associated with 
terrorists. Victims face the double load of “dealing with a physical 
attack and a societal stigma”.89
The lives of civilians in areas where drones regularly operate are 
like hell on earth. In addition to fear, people who live in the areas 
where drones constantly operate described signs of “anxiety and 
post-traumatic stress disorder”. Victims also described “emotional 
breakdowns, running indoors or hiding when drones appear above, 
fainting, nightmares and other intrusive thoughts, hyper-startled 
reactions to loud noises, outbursts of anger or irritability and loss 
of appetite.90 According to medical health practitioners of Pakistan, 
in drone targeted areas insomnia and other physical symptoms are 
very common.91
88 K. Grayson, ‘Cultural politics of targeted killing: On drones, counter-insurgency, 
and violence’, Routledge, 2016.
89 S. Holewinski, ‘The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of 
Targeted Killing’, 30 April 2013, https://civiliansinconflict.org, (accessed 17 
November 2017).
90 M. N. Riaz., R. Sultana., S. Z. Shah., N. Batool., & M. G. Murad,  ‘Outcomes 
of belief in just world among victims of natural and man-made disaster: 
Moderating role of resilience’, Pakistan Journal of Psychological Research, 
vol. 30, no.1, 2015, p. 39.
91 C. Wood, ‘Drones causing mass trauma among civilians,’ major study finds’, 25 
September 2012, [website], https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com, (accessed 
29 November 2017).
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ARMED DRONES AND THE CONCERNS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
International organisations especially the Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch have, through a joint report, raised their serious 
concerns over the extrajudicial killings of Pakistan’s civilians. This 
report states that the US has violated international laws and therefore 
“US officials responsible for the secret drone campaign against suspected 
terrorists in Pakistan may have committed war crimes and should stand 
trial.”92 The Human Rights Watch calls upon the US government to 
explain publicly its legal justification for conducting targeted killings 
and the legitimate restrictions of drone strikes which were ignored by 
the US authority. This has further increased concerns about the legality 
of the US’s drone strikes.93 Both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International call upon the US to share the information related to drone 
strikes publicly including videos of the strikes to show that the strikes 
comply with international law standards. Arguably, the US should 
investigate allegations of extrajudicial killings where there is sound 
evidence of unlawful action by US officials. The US administration 
should also arrange compensation to all victims of illegitimate strikes 
and prosecute those CIA officials who are responsible for conducting 
unlawful strikes.94
Fifty other organisations are also demanding:-
The UN Secretary-General to consider the worries of Navi Pillay •	
who is the United Nation’s leading human rights official and 
investigate whether the drone strikes are violating international 
laws. Additionally, impose sanctions against the states which are 
utilising, having and making armed drones.
The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to •	
investigate and conduct a criminal trial of those responsible 
for the killings of innocent civilians in drone strikes. 
 
92 The Guardian, ‘US drone strikes could be classed as war crimes, says Amnesty 
International’, 22 October 2013, https://www.theguardian.com, (accessed 22 
November 2017).
93 Human rights watch, ‘Q & A: US Targeted Killings and International Law’, 19 
December 2011, https://www.hrw.org, (accessed 13 November 2017).
94 Amnesty International, USA must be held to account for drone killings in 
Pakistan, [website], 2013, https://www.amnesty.org, (accessed 15 November 
2017).
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The US Secretary of State and the US ambassadors in other •	
states to support any international agreement prohibiting the 
possession or use of armed drones.
The US to end its “kill list” program.•	 95
CONCLUSION
Drones have desensitised and brutalised war by eliminating soldiers 
from the battlefield. Drone encounters draw a fine line between 
legitimate uses of drones and extrajudicial killings. In order to 
safeguard human rights, states possessing armed drones must 
update their knowledge about human rights responsibilities under 
international laws. Also, the use of drones must be strengthened 
through stringent accountability measures. Drones work as a new 
approach for calamities in current disputes. Therefore, the use of this 
disastrous drone force should be eliminated for creating ethical and 
legal problems. In making war “less human, we may also be making 
it less humane.”96 In order to know the legitimacy of drone attacks, 
it is important to note that article 2(4) of the UN charter prohibits 
any member state to use force against any other member state of 
the United Nations. Article 51 is the only exception that allows the 
use of force under “Customary International Law” in self-defence. 
Thus, US drone attacks in Pakistan make up an act of war because 
the use of lethal force is only lawful for self-defence in real armed 
conflict. According to the ICJ, targeting non-state actors in the “host 
countries” is a violation of Customary International Law. A foreign 
state can target terrorist groups with the consent of the “host state”. 
However, drone strikes without the consent or wish of a “host state” 
are completely unlawful.97
Even if drone attacks are legitimate or do not form an act of war 
against any state or are being performed with the consent of the “host 
state”, they have to meet specified humanitarian law doctrines. In 
95 D. Swanson, ‘50 Organizations Seek Ban on Armed Drones’, 2013, 10 
November 2013, http://rootsaction.org, (accessed 21 November 2017).
96 P. Hassner, L. Xiang, J. Mazo & B. Tertrais, ‘Politics and international relations’, 
Global Politics and Strategy, vol.52, no.1, 2010, p.199-226.
97 J. Bachman, ‘Drones are bringing the warzone to a theater near you’, Peace 
Review, vol. 27, no.4, 2015, p. 418-423.
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the case of Pakistan, the absence of official consent for drone strikes 
in the territory of Pakistan is a violation of its sovereignty. Even if 
Pakistan has given secret or tacit consent as claimed by the US, drone 
strikes must operate based on the principles of distinction, necessity 
and proportionality. Human rights groups expressed severe concerns 
that Pakistan’s government has failed to safeguard and provide the 
civil rights assured under articles 15, 16, 20, 24 of the constitution 
of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 to the victims of drone 
attacks. Pakistan must independently investigate all drone strikes 
in the country and ensure access to justice and compensation for 
victims. Moreover, we must end the conspiracy of silence against 
drone strikes and shine the light of the independent investigation 
into the practice. The drone strikes are not only on the individuals 
who have been killed but also on international law itself.
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